STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. Volume 1, THE POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, by G. Alan Tarr and Robert F. Williams (eds). Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. 217pp. Hardcover $40.00. ISBN: 9780791466131. Paperback $19.95. ISBN: 9780791466148.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. Volume 2, DRAFTING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS, AND AMENDMENTS, by Frank P. Grad and Robert F. Williams. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. 135pp. Hardcover $40.50. ISBN: 9780791466476. Paperback $17.95. ISBN: 9780791466483.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. Volume 3, THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, by G. Alan Tarr and Robert F. Williams (eds). Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. 374pp. Hardcover $50.00. ISBN: 9780791467114. Paper. $24.95. ISBN: 9780791467121.

All three volumes. 752pp. Hardcover. $100.00. ISBN: 9780791470015. Paper. $50.00. ISBN: 9780791470022.

Reviewed by Dan Friedman, Esquire, Saul Ewing LLP, Baltimore, Maryland and University of Maryland School of Law (adjunct). Email: dfriedman [at]



In 1967, the state of Maryland held a constitutional convention and proposed a new draft document to replace its hundred year-old charter that had been written in the aftermath of the American Civil War. Criticism of the resultant draft Maryland constitution, which drew upon the model promulgated by the National Municipal League, came in many forms and from many sources, included charges that it was “too intellectual” and “too progressive.” The draft and its framers also suffered from a political naiveté that resulted in allowing opponents of specific proposals to coalesce against the whole document, leading to a stunning defeat at the polls in May of 1968 (Friedman 2000, at 534).

Elizabeth Chesnut Barnes, a member of the Maryland bar, daughter of Maryland’s long-serving federal district judge, W. Calvin Chesnut, and wife of her father’s former law clerk, Judge Wilson K. Barnes of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, led an important opposition group called “Save our State.” Mrs. Barnes laid out her group’s opposition to the draft constitution in an article published in the MAGAZINE OF THE DAUGHTERS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Barnes 1968). Mrs. Barnes argued that the draft document was a “Mail Order Constitution” drafted by the National Municipal League without regard for principles of limited government or for Maryland’s unique traditions. Her arguments have an anachronistic, 1950’s feel. Relying on tracts published by the [*348] John Birch Society, Mrs. Barnes argued that the National Municipal League’s radical agenda was to eliminate the states and replace them with 12 regional government collectives, which, in her Cold War-era rhetoric, she derided as “soviets.”

To my thinking there can be no doubt that the National Municipal League and its Model State Constitution contributed greatly to the development of our modern thinking about state constitutions. G. Alan Tarr of Rutgers University (one of the editors of the books reviewed) has done substantial work in analyzing the importance of the Model State Constitution to the development of state constitutional law (Tarr 1998, at 151-157). But despite the vital role performed by the National Municipal League and the Model State Constitution, and despite her over-heated rhetoric, Mrs. Barnes’ criticisms might also have merit. The Model State Constitution may have been too uniform, too doctrinaire, and too indifferent to state-specific traditions, concerns, and variations.

It is as a response to this criticism of the National Municipal League and the Model State Constitution that I see the value of this new series, STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. As Tarr describes in the introduction to the third volume: “State constitutions necessarily reflect diverse state constitutional traditions, historical developments within individual states, and the particular political complexion of each state. As a consequence no single model is appropriate for all states, and this volume eschews the creation of a model state constitution” (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 4). Instead, these volumes dig deeper, and make suggestions for improving each state constitution while still respecting the important diversity in the constitutions of our fifty states.


Volume 1 of this series explores, through six case studies, the politics of constitutional revision, including creating a favorable climate for constitutional revision, selecting the appropriate (or most effective) means of constitutional revision, and choosing methods for garnering support for the proposed revisions.

The first three essays investigate the role of constitutional commissions in constitutional reform. Rebecca Mae Salokar’s essay analyzes the effectiveness of a novel system under Florida’s 1968 constitution that creates a periodic revision commission that may propose constitutional amendments directly to the voters without legislative involvement (p.19). Salokar chronicles the failure of the 1978 Revision Commission to get any of its proposals adopted and contrasts that failure with the very successful 1998 Revision Commission. Such a revision commission system may prove salutary, if difficult to implement, in other states in which the legislature proves to be an obstacle to responsible constitutional amendment. The broader lesson of Salokar’s essay, however, is that the success of Florida’s 1998 Revision [*349] Commission may, in part, be attributed to its efforts to engage the public in setting the agenda for constitutional revision and to educate the public about the revisions proposed. Those lessons are immediately transferable to any system of constitutional revision.

The second essay, by Bruce Cain, compares the methods of constitutional change used in California (p.59). While the California Constitutional Revision Commission presents an attractive forum for deliberative discussion, it has proven unsuccessful in having its proposals adopted. By contrast, California has seemingly fallen in love with the constitutional initiative, which has produced “piecemeal and disjointed” amendments. Cain argues the uncontroversial point that wholesale, coherent revision is preferable to the initiative-amendment-mania that has gripped California. Given the procedural advantages of initiative amendment over the commission revision track, however, Cain argues that future commissions must coordinate with public opinion and be willing to surrender high-minded aspirational proposals in favor of more politically attractive proposals. Obviously, this recommendation remains important even removed from the California context of revision commissions and initiative amendment-mania.

A. E. Dick Howard’s contribution, “Adopting a New Constitution: Lessons from Virginia,” is the third essay in this volume (p.73). The essay, which originally appeared in the UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW in 1974, has a homey, old-fashioned quality, despite the final section that updates its conclusions. Howard identifies both extensive educational outreach and bipartisan support as the key factors permitting holistic constitutional reform. Ominously, Howard’s newly-added conclusion notes that it would be difficult in the charged partisan atmosphere of present day Virginia politics (and likely so in other states) to replicate the conditions that enabled constitutional reform.

The second half of volume 1 turns its attention to the manner in which constitutional reform is put on a state’s political agenda. H. Bailey Thomson chronicles nearly 90 years of unsuccessful efforts to reform the Alabama constitution (p.113). Even today, despite bipartisan citizen support, Alabama lawmakers have thus far stymied grassroots citizen efforts at constitutional reform. Similarly, Gerald Benjamin’s essay describes the political difficulties that have prevented voters from responding favorably to the mandatory question of whether to call for a constitutional convention in New York (p.145). Finally, Anne G. Campbell’s essay, “Direct Democracy and Constitutional Reform: Campaign Finance Initiatives in Colorado,” takes a wholly different approach, as she traces the decisions, road-blocks, and ultimate success in amending the state constitution – by citizen initiative – to provide campaign finance reform (p.175).

The six essays of Volume 1 present an interesting picture. One might quibble about the extent to which the six states discussed are illustrative of the recurrent, [*350] nationwide political issues surrounding constitutional revision. The implications of these essays for Maryland, however, are very clear.

The Maryland constitution was originally drafted during the American Revolution. Maryland held three state constitutional conventions in the middle of the 19th Century, and the current constitution was drafted in 1867, in the immediate aftermath of the American Civil War. In the 1960s, after U.S. Supreme Court decisions requiring reapportionment of state legislatures (MARYLAND COMM. FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION v. TAWES 1964; BAKER v. CARR 1962), Marylanders called the state constitutional convention of 1967-1968, described above. The proposed constitution was rejected by the voters. Since then, Marylanders have been reluctant to call a constitutional convention, and have, instead, made only piecemeal changes to their constitution (Friedman 2000, at 598-599). The result is an unwieldy constitution that is hard to read, hard to interpret, and hard to understand.

One provision of the Maryland constitution requires the legislature to “tak[e] . . . the sense of the People in regard to calling a Convention for altering this Constitution” every 20 years (Md. Const., Art. XIV, §2). The next such vote, if everything proceeds on schedule, will be held in November of 2010. Without public support there will be no constitutional convention. And without significant efforts to engage the public in setting an agenda for constitutional reform, there is no chance for public support. That is the message of Volume 1 for Marylanders and citizens of other states where such a regime is in place.


The second volume of the series is a detour – a welcome detour, but a detour nonetheless. In contrast to the other two volumes of the series, which are essay collections, Volume 2 is a single, unified piece. It also violates the chronological order of the series – it addresses the drafting of state constitutions, which must come after putting state constitutional reform onto the political agenda (Volume 1) and after setting the substantive state constitutional agenda (Volume 3). Volume 2 is, on its own terms, however, a terrific manual for any drafter (and perhaps of equal importance, for any interpreter) of state constitutions.

The history of Volume 2 is noteworthy. Frank Grad of Columbia Law School wrote the antecedents of this volume in anticipation of the New York state constitutional convention in 1963. Grad’s work was circulated, in mimeograph form, to the staffs of state constitutional conventions throughout the country in the 1960s and beyond. I first saw the purple pages of Grad’s book in my review of the documents of the Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968. For the STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY series, Grad has worked with his former student, Robert F. Williams of Rutgers Law School (himself a founding father [*351] of the field of state constitutionalism), to revise and update this forty-something-year-old reference work for its initial formal publication. The book is directed to the drafters of state constitutions, but its widest readership will come from those interested, not in drafting themselves, but in interpreting the work of others.

Interpreting state constitutions is a unique exercise. Although the techniques applicable to interpreting the federal constitution, on the one hand, and ordinary legislation (and even private contracts) on the other, may be useful, those techniques cannot be dispositive. Grad and Williams provide useful insights into the interpretive issues arising from the multi-step process of state constitution writing and amendation that may obscure the role of “legislative” or “framers’” intent; the state constitution’s role as a document of limitation on authority not a grant of power; as well as interpretive canons that may limit the effect of provisions, including the distinction between mandatory and directory provisions, the self-executing/non-self executing dichotomy, and the doctrine of substantial compliance. Each of these interpretive questions is important to anyone – judges, lawyers, and citizens – who would seek to determine the meaning of a state constitution.

A recent decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals serves to illustrate the value of Volume 2 of this series. The case, FREDERICK v. PICKETT (2006), presented (at least tangentially) an interpretive question unique to state constitutions: the problem of negative implication. What is the effect of a constitutional amendment telling the General Assembly that it may legislate on one specific topic when it already had the power to legislate on that and every other topic? Is the amendment merely redundant? Or does it create – by negative implication – a limitation that was not there before?

Before 1960, the General Assembly of Maryland clearly had both (1) the power to condemn private property for public use so long as just compensation was paid; and (2) the power to delegate its condemnation power to local governments. In 1960, however, the people of Maryland passed a constitutional amendment granting the General Assembly the power to authorize local governments to exercise condemnation authority in “slum areas” only. The amendment makes clear that only an area with multiple buildings can be a “slum area.” Trouble arose in 1995 when the legislature passed a statute authorizing local governments to condemn property in non-slum areas. Did the 1960 amendment, by negative implication, divest the General Assembly of the power it used to adopt the 1995 statute? The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in PICKETT, did not answer the question, choosing instead to decide the case on a statutory basis (Friedman and Nichols 2006).

If the Court of Appeals had attempted to address the problem of negative implication raised in the PICKETT case, it would have had difficulty finding an interpretive aide to help it think about the problem. No treatise on federal constitutional theory would have proven [*352] useful: because the federal constitution is a document that grants (rather than limits) governmental powers, the problem of negative implications does not arise. I suspect that interpreters of a state constitution might treat the problem the same as if it had arisen under ordinary legislation or even as if it had arisen under contract law. Under either of those two arguably analogous circumstances, a court would likely apply the canon of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing means the exclusion of another). Thus, in the PICKETT example, the positive grant of the power to delegate condemnation authority in slum areas by definition includes the withdrawal of the same authority for use in non-slum areas. That is what state supreme courts generally do with the problem of negative implication, mostly, I think, because they are so much more familiar with the interpretation of ordinary legislation and of contracts.

Grad and Williams, focused exclusively on state constitutions, suggest caution in ascribing negative implications to state constitutional amendment or in using the expressio unius principle for interpreting state constitutions (pp.83-86). The sovereign people of the state, exercising their power to amend the constitution, might have considered only the question presented to them and not inquired into existing law (pp.76-78). Moreover, for the voters, adoption of a constitutional amendment is a binary question – yes or no – and no opportunity is given for the citizens to broaden the issue. Had they been asked the question, maybe the voters would have granted (somewhat redundantly) the power to delegate condemnation authority in both slum and non-slum areas. They were not asked and, Grad and Williams seem to counsel, we should not presume. Of course, this analysis of negative implications is predicated on the traditional constitutional amendment process as employed in Maryland. If a constitutional commission had studied the issue (as happens, for example in Florida (Tarr and Williams 2006a, 19)), the outcome might well be different.


In Volume 3 of the series, a different expert is assigned to each of the common articles of state constitutions to review those topics that can or should be on a state’s agenda of constitutional reform. The result is terrific. The chapter authors treat their respective subjects comprehensively with a 50-state review that leads to a variety of suggestions that would modernize state constitutions, while simultaneously being respectful of the independent and different histories, traditions, and values of the state constitutions. In this way, each essay fulfills the highest aspirations of modernization that reflect the work of its predecessor in the National Municipal League’s model state constitution, while simultaneously avoiding the pitfalls pointed out (albeit somewhat hysterically) by Elizabeth Chesnut Barnes.

Rather than undertake an essay-by-essay review of each of these excellent essays, I pay them the compliment of using [*353] them as they were intended, to help define the agenda for possible state constitutional reform. For purposes of this review I will use the Maryland case as an example. (And of course, as described above, engaging in the public discussion of an agenda for constitutional revision is necessary to building public support for a constitutional convention and ultimate adoption of a revised constitution).

Chapter One: Rights

Robert F. Williams’ essay looks holistically at the rights provisions of state constitutions. While not suggesting that all states adopt any specific list, Williams urges consideration of a variety of categories of rights provisions. Maryland’s Declaration of Rights, drafted in 1776, and updated periodically over the last 230 years, presents a specific, detailed list of rights (Friedman 1998). It is now 47 articles long. Other rights provisions, including the protection against condemnation without just compensation, are scattered throughout the Maryland Constitution (Md. Const., Art. III, §40). Length (or number of rights provisions), however, should not be confused with comprehensiveness. Viewing Williams’ recommendations against the current Maryland Declaration of Rights produces the following potential agenda items:

Should Maryland revise its eminent domain provisions to restrict government’s ability to condemn private property (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 24-25)?

Because the text of the constitution does not contain one, Maryland courts must imply the existence of an equality guarantee (Friedman 2006, 35). Should Maryland add an explicit, textual equality guarantee (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 20-24)?

Should Maryland adopt an explicit right to privacy (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 26)?

Should Maryland reconsider three new rights that it rejected in 1968: (1) an explicit right to freedom from invidious forms of discrimination; (2) a protection against electronic eavesdropping; or (3) a guaranty of fair treatment in investigations (Friedman 2000, 542-543)?

Should Maryland consider adding a prohibition against double jeopardy (which it currently lacks)?

Should Maryland adopt a modern statement of position on so-called “tort reform” (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 18-19; Friedman 2006, 26-27)?

Should Maryland add a provision protecting the rights of prisoners (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 19-20)?

Should Maryland add “positive rights” to protect the elderly or the poor (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 25-26)?

Chapter Two: The Legislative Branch

Michael E. Libonati presents an analysis of the legislative provisions of state constitutions. Not surprisingly, Maryland’s constitution provides for each of the elements identified by Libonati as important in a state constitution’s legislative article, but the phrasing of many of these provisions is neither modern nor concise. An agenda for [*354] Maryland constitutional reform might include the following:

In all state constitutions, the responsibility for the budget and appropriation process is divided between executive and legislative branches. In Maryland, the division of that responsibility is heavily weighted in favor of the governor (Friedman 2006, 59, 133-142). Should Maryland consider a different distribution of budget responsibility?

Should Maryland join the national trend away from multi-member legislative districts in favor of single member districts (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 52-53)?

Should Maryland liberalize its legislative procedure provisions, including the single subject rule, descriptive title rule, the prohibition on special laws, and reading and voting requirements (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 55-59)?

Should Maryland consider modernizing the legislative investigative power (Friedman 2006, 103-104)?

Should Maryland modernize its impeachment provisions (Friedman 2006, 102-103)?

Chapter Three: The Executive Branch

Thad Beyle provides a framework for considering the powers provided governors under each state’s constitution. While Beyle notes a significant increase in gubernatorial power in all of the states over the last forty-two years (from 14.8 on his scale in 1960 to 17.7 in 2002), the powers of the Maryland governor still significantly exceed the national average (using Beyle’s scale, I calculate that Maryland’s governor scores a whopping 21.5). In fact, Maryland’s governor is one of the nation’s strongest (Friedman 2006, 133-159). The principal question for any agenda of constitutional revision is whether the governor has sufficiently unified executive powers. If not, the state might consider, as we did in 1967-1968, making the offices of Attorney General and Comptroller appointed rather than independently elected (Friedman 2000, 560-562). Constitutional reformers might also consider clarifying the eligibility requirements to serve as Attorney General (ABRAMS v. LAMONE 2007).

Chapter Four: The Judicial Branch

Alan Tarr’s essay assesses modernization of state court systems through state constitutional revision. Many of the goals of consolidation and professionalization have previously been accomplished in Maryland, although not always by constitutional amendment (Friedman 2000, 571-578). An agenda for Maryland constitutional reform should include the following topics concerning the judiciary:

Should Maryland consolidate the various circuit courts into a unified statewide court (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 87-88; Friedman 2000, 573)?

Should the merit-based judicial nomination process be enshrined in the state constitution (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 98-100; Friedman 2000, 574-576)?

Should Maryland abandon contested circuit court judicial elections in favor of retention elections (Tarr and Williams 2006b, 98-100; Friedman 2000, 574-576)? [*355]

Chapter Five: Local Government

In a second essay, Michael E. Libonati considers current state constitutional trends in local government provisions. Maryland’s constitutional provisions establishing local governments are in need of modernization. Article XI, which describes the form and powers of Baltimore City, is largely obsolete (Friedman 2006, 210). The other local government provisions, Md. Const., Arts. XI-XI-I, are difficult to read and harmonize. These provisions create, in effect, four different categories of “county” government: (1) the county commissioner form, (2) the code home rule form, (3) the charter home rule form, and (4) the special form of charter home rule that applies to Baltimore City. Another provision, Md. Const., Art. XI-E, creates the structure and powers for municipalities (except Baltimore City). The Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968 sought to unify this system by forcing each county to accept a charter home rule form of government (Friedman 2000, 578-582). This proved to be a divisive issue with voters in 1968, and, on the subsequent occasions on which counties have independently considered adopting charter home rule, home rule has not been universally popular (Friedman 2000, 582 n. 303). Nonetheless, it is incumbent on potential constitutional reformers to fashion a harmonious modern system of local government provisions that will be efficient, effective, and acceptable to the voters. Libonati’s essay will provide a good starting place.

Chapter Six: Voting and Elections

In his essay, James A. Gardner addresses voting and elections. While other issues may emerge and become relevant, three topics he identifies are already on Maryland’s state constitutional agenda. First, based on its interpretation of the state constitution, the Maryland Court of Appeals recently invalidated legislative attempts to create “early voting” (LAMONE v. CAPOZZI 2006). Constitutional reformers may wish to consider revising the provisions to permit early voting or other innovative methods of increasing voter participation. Second, Maryland statutory and constitutional law is among the most restrictive in disenfranchisement for felony conviction. While legislative changes currently under consideration may remedy this, the issue is ripe for constitutional inquiry. Third, in my view the standards for legislative apportionment require adjustment to avoid a recurrence of the Court’s rudderless invalidation of the 2002 legislative redistricting plan (In re LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTING 2002).

Chapter Seven: Constitutional Amendment and Revision

Gerald Benjamin provides an excellent chapter on constitutional amendment and revision. This is an area of the Maryland constitution that works well and has created only minimal controversy. In fact, those controversies have been satisfactorily resolved by judicial opinion. I suspect that future constitutional framers may wish to update the language, but likely not the methods, of state constitutional revision in Maryland. [*356]

Chapter Eight: State and Local Finance

Richard Briffault’s essay notes “the enormous gap between the written [state and local government finance] provisions of state constitutions and actual practice” (p.212). He might well be discussing Maryland’s experience (Friedman 2006, 118). Briffault urges reformers to abandon the state constitutional public purpose doctrine in favor of improved disclosure of the public benefits claimed. Briffault gives a lukewarm endorsement to retaining state constitutional debt limitations, but suggests that reformers avoid continuing or adding additional process requirements. Briffault also reviews newer state constitutional limits on taxation and/or expenditures (which Maryland’s current constitution does not contain). Although Maryland state constitutional reformers will almost inevitably consider adopting such limitations, Briffault generally counsels against their adoption.

Chapter Nine: Education

Paul L. Tractenberg takes on the educational provisions of state constitutions, providing the history of such provisions, the varied interpretations given those provisions, and a long list of potential components of a modern state constitutional education provision. While Maryland’s provision, Md. Const., Art. VIII, §1, is certainly not modern – it was drafted in 1867 (Leviton and Joseph 1993) – its requirement that the state provide a “thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools” is similar to provisions found in many other state constitutions. The Court of Appeals, however, has given this provision a narrow interpretation and held that Maryland’s constitution does not protect education as a fundamental right (HORNBECK v. SOMERSET COUNTY BOARD OF EDUC. 1983). Future framers of a Maryland constitution will need to consult Tractenberg’s chapter if they wish to make the right to education fundamental and enforceable.

Chapter Ten: The Environment and Natural Resources

Barton H. Thompson, Jr.’s chapter analyzes state constitutional provisions that provide for protection of natural resources and the environment. Maryland is among the minority of states that lack such provisions. An agenda for constitutional reform should include a discussion of whether and what type of environmental protection provision should be added.


The three volumes of STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY are a wonderful resource for anyone seeking to amend or interpret a state constitution. They provide universal guidance to the state constitutional reformer without falling into the trap of ignoring each individual state’s unique history, tradition, circumstances, and culture.


Barnes, Elizabeth Chesnut. 1968 (February). “Mail Order Constitutions – The Twilight Of The States?” DAUGHTERS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION MAGAZINE 90. [*357]

Friedman, Dan, and Megan R. Nichols. 2006. “FREDERICK v. PICKETT: Questions For Another Day” THE DAILY RECORD (September 5).

Friedman, Dan. 1998. “The History, Development, and Interpretation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” 71 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW 637.

Friedman, Dan. 2000. “Magnificent Failure Revisited, Modern Maryland Constitutional Law, 1967-1999.” 58 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW 528.

Friedman, Dan. 2002. “Tracing the Lineage: Textual and Conceptual Similarities in the Revolutionary-Era State Declarations of Rights of Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware.” 33 RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL 929-1028.


Leviton, Susan P., and Matthew H. Joseph. 1993. “An Adequate Education for All Maryland’s Children: Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required.” 52 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW 1137.

Tarr, G. Alan. 1998. UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


ABRAMS v. LAMONE, ____ Md. ____ (2007).

BAKER v. CARR, 369 U.S.186 (1962).

FREDERICK v. PICKETT, 392 Md. 411 (2006).


LAMONE v. CAPOZZI, 396 Md. 53 (2006).

In re LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTING, 370 Md. 272 (2002).


© Copyright 2007 by the author, Dan Friedman.